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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to reduce the aviation accidents and incidents induced by flight crew errors. A flight crew 
errors analysis and classification system is developed preliminary. In combination with aviation flight accidents 
exploration, and interviews with pilots, the human error modes which will occur in the flight task are identified. A 
quantitative method to assess flight crew errors is established on Technique For Human Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP). In a case study, the takeoff task is analyzed, the human error modes and consequences are identified, and 
the failure probability of takeoff task is calculated. Those results are useful for SSA (System Safety Assessment) to 
improve the aircraft safety design. 
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1. Introduction 
Aviation safety depends on the aircraft design, manufacture, entry into service and maintenance 
throughout the whole life cycle of an aircraft. The statistic data show that about 75% of aviation accidents 
are induced by human factors, and that human error is the primary risk to flight safety [1,2]. The ultimate 
way to improve this status is to take into account the human factor issues at the very beginning of the 
aircraft type design. 
In the old days, the safety design philosophy was merely focused on purely technological issues such 
as hardware performance and reliability. Along with the evolution of aeronautics and aerospace, it is 
widely recognized that, being a complex system, human does have significant effects on aviation safety. 
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Nowadays, as a part of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), human reliability analysis (HRA) has made 
important contribution to the improvement of the Nuclear Power Plant safety [3]. Technique For Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) is the first approach in HRA and is still widely used in a range of 
applications even beyond its original nuclear setting. 
Compared with PRA, System Safety Assessment (SSA) is a systematic and comprehensive evaluation 
of implemented system to show that relevant safety requirements are met [4]. SSA is a suit of effective 
methodologies to insure the safety level of the aircraft. 
This study attempts to use THERP to assess human errors and integrate the results into SSA to 
supplement the current safety assessment methodology. 
2. Identification of Flight Crew Errors 
The first step to assess flight crew errors is the human error identification (HEI). There are many 
human error identification systems, and each of them has its own taxonomy and purpose. For instance, 
TRACEr was developed with experimental studies, literature review and analysis of ATC incidents to 
reduce human errors in air traffic control. Likewise HFACS was established with Reason’s model for the 
investigation of accidents. Additionally, Human Error Template (HET) has been developed specifically 
for the aerospace. However, the HET error taxonomy was based upon the External Error Modes (EEM) 
and is a qualitative method. 
2.1. Flight Crew Errors Analysis and Classification 
In this paper, a flight crew error analysis and classification system is developed as shown in Fig 1, 
which synthesizes the O’Hare classification frame of flight crew error assessment, the Wickens’ 
information processing model, the Rasmussen’s model and the Hollnage’s error classification theory. The 
brief description is as follows: 
There are four models in this system. Combined with the exploration of aviation flight 
accidents/incidents and interviews with pilots, the human error modes are identified. 
(1)Model 1: Information acquisition and detection based on stimulus and task 
There are four aspects for pilots to acquire information: the visual sensation, the auditory, the spatial 
orientation and the experience & knowledge. And the human errors could be omit, lapse, timing error, 
spatial illusion and wrong partten. 
(2)Model 2: Information Perception based on knowledge and rule 
Generally, there are two ways to perceive information for the pilot: the information perception based 
on the rule and on the knowledge. And the human errors could be omit, lapse, timing error and wrong 
partten. 
(3)Model 3: Information decision and response selection based on knowledge and rule 
Generally, there are two classes: the decision making based on the rule and on the knowledge. And the 
human errors could be omit, lapse, timing error and decision-making error. 
(4)Model 4: Information response execution based on skill 
Hollnagel[5] defined eight types of human error actions. According to our analysis, five types of 
human errors in this stage are identified. The human errors could be the force error, the direction error, the 
timing error, the sequence error and the speed error. 
According to the analysis on each model, we established the chart as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Flight crew error modes 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 
Human error 
mode Omit Lapse 
Spatial 
illusion 
Wrong 
pattern 
Decision-
making 
error 
Number 6 7 8 9 10 
Human error 
mode 
Direction 
error 
Timing 
error 
Speed 
error 
Sequence 
error 
Force 
error 
 
 
Fig. 1. Flow chart of Flight crew analysis and classification system 
2.2. Performance Shape Factors(PSF) 
So as to correct the human error probability, any factor that influences human performance is 
designated as a performance shaping factor [6]. PSFs can be divided into three classes: External PSFs, 
Internal PSFs and Stressors. In view of the flight task features and the flight deck design philosophy, the 
pilot’s PSFs are discussed here. 
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(1) External PSFs 
External PSFs are situational characteristics, task & equipment characteristics and job & task 
instructions. The situational characteristics include cockpit environment (e.g. temperature, humidity, air 
quality, noise, illumination, etc.), work & break hours, shift rotation & night work, availability and 
adequacy of equipment/system. The task & equipment characteristics include perceptual requirements, 
motor requirements, complexity, criticality, frequency & repetitiveness and man-machine interface factors. 
The job & task instructions include flight manual, procedures, oral/paper communication, alert and 
attention. 
(2) Internal PSFs 
Internal PSFs are pilot training experience, working experience & skill, sex differences and physical 
condition. Whereas the flight crews are well trained and qualified, the internal PSFs will not have 
conspicuous effect on human error probability compared with the external PSFs. 
(3)Stressors 
The stressor is any external or internal force that causes bodily or mental tension [6]. It appears to arise 
whenever there is a mismatch between the internal PSFs and the external PSFs. Stressors can be 
psychological, physiological, or a combination of both. The psychological stressors include task speed, 
workload, high risk, threats and disturb. The physiological stressors include duration of stress, fatigue, 
pain or discomfort, hunger or thirst, temperature extremes, radiation, oxygen insufficiency, vibration and 
disruption of circadian rhythm. 
3. Method to Assess Flight Crew Errors 
In view of the whole flight operation environment, the process to assess flight crew errors is shown in 
Fig 2. It is based on THERP method. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Flow chart of human error assessment 
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There are 9 steps in this process: 
 (1)Data gathering and analysis 
Gathering all the information related to flight crew errors, e.g. design deficiency data, 
accidents/incidents data and flight manual. 
 (2)Task analysis 
In this paper, we use HTA method [7] to analyze flight task. The most remarkable points in this step 
are the stopping rule and the rule to select critical operations. In order to predict the flight crew errors, it 
should be analyzed in each sub-operation. Considering the flight task features, the goal should be 
decomposed to two levels.  
In view of SSA objectives, it is impossible and unnecessary to calculate each identified operational 
task. The operational task, of which the failure condition is catastrophic, hazardous or major, needs both 
qualitative and quantitative assessments. Hence for the rule to select critical operations, once some 
operation is forbidden in flight manual or has induced flight accidents/incidents that it need to be selected 
in decomposition of sub-goal. The others should be selected on the discussion with the flight specialists or 
the test. 
(3)Scenario analysis 
Scenario analysis is based on the acknowledged events or the perspectives. It includes the behaviors 
under given conditions/context. Several components should be considered such as participant, equipment 
& environment, task and the abnormal condition. 
(4)Event tree analysis 
According to the results of task analysis, the event tree is established. The aim is to analyze human 
errors.    
(5)PSFs determination 
PSF has been discussed in section 2.2. Different scenario presents different PSFs. PSF depends on the 
scenario assumed. 
(6)Determination of human error mode 
Human error modes have been discussed in section 2.1. It will be determined based on the final task 
analysis. 
(7)Human error probability 
The human error probability lies on the specialists’ judgment, the test analysis or the experience used 
in other correlative fields as references. 
The effects due to personal differences and environment on the human performance, should be 
concerned. The realistic human error probability of each subtask will be corrected by PSFs: 
1 2BHEP NHEP PSF PSF u u u (1) 
In formula 1, NHEP is nominal human error probability which is the realistic probability without 
consideration of the influences from environment and personal differences. BHEP is basic human error 
probability which is the probability of a human error on a task. It is considered as an isolated entity and 
unaffected by any other task. PSF1, PSF2,… are the values of different PSFs. 
The failure probability of each subtask in the Event tree is a conditional probability. The 
interdependence among subtasks, which is important in risk assessment, should be considered while 
calculating conditional probability. Without consideration of interdependence of the events, the risk will 
be underestimated, and the safety level will be sequentially reduced. 
Generally, the methods for assessing interdependence are as the following: 
(a) Use of the actual data. 
(b) Objective evaluation. 
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(c) Use of positive dependence model [5] in which dependences are classified into five types: zero 
dependence(ZD), low dependence(LD), moderate dependence(MD), high dependence(HD) and complete 
dependence(CD). 
In this paper, because of the limitation of data, only the positive dependence model is applied. 
(8)Human error management 
The effective management should be performed specially on the failure condition which is major, 
hazardous or catastrophic, as well as those very high frequency occurrences. Design is an effective way to 
manage human error, e.g. making proper operational procedure, deploying reasonable operational task or 
error prevention design. Each aspect of SHEL model should be considered and carefully designed. 
(9)System Safety Assessment 
As required in FAR/CS part 25 and the correlative policy and memo [8,9], the results will be an 
evidence for the system designer to proof whether the design is acceptable or not. It can also be the input 
of PSSA and CMA. 
4. Case Studies 
In this paper, the takeoff phase of A320 is studied. The task analysis is performed under the HTA 
method as shown in Fig 3. 
The human error modes and the consequences induced by each subtask are analyzed and summarized 
in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Task analysis in the takeoff phase 
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Table 2 Human error modes and consequences in the takeoff phase 
Subtask Human error mode Description  Consequence  
Check/adjust 
takeoff data 
Omit  The flight crew forgets to calculate takeoff 
speed and neither check takeoff configuration 
nor validate takeoff weight limitation.  
The appropriate takeoff speed 
cannot be determined. 
Lapse PF does not calculate takeoff speed and FLX 
temperature independently. 
The calculation result cannot be 
verified. 
Misread the number. The calculation result is wrong. 
Permit to launch Timing error Misunderstand that the aircraft is permitted 
to launch and then execute it. 
Ground accident could occur. 
Set to IGN/START Timing error Before permit to launch, task is executed. Ground accident could occur. 
Operate engine 
start sequence 
Sequence error The engine start sequence is operated wrong. The engine cannot be started. 
Close ground 
spoiler 
Lapse  Ground spoiler is armed. The acceleration is abnormal and 
the distance of takeoff needs to be 
longer. 
Flat set to takeoff Lapse  Flat position is set incorrectly. Influence on takeoff performance. 
Rudder and pitch 
trim 
Spatial illusion Because of the different views, it is not 
trimmed indeed. 
The aircraft needs to be controlled 
manually. 
Check the brakes Omit  Forget to check the brakes The distance of takeoff is too long. 
Check flight 
control 
Omit  Forget to check flight control Influence on flight control. 
Check flight 
instrument 
Omit  Forget to check some flight data. Do not understand the condition of 
the aircraft. 
Lapse The parameters in the instrument are 
misread. 
Influence on takeoff performance. 
Thrust lever sets to 
FLX/TOGA 
Lapse The thrust lever sets to the wrong position. The thrust is incorrect. 
Scan PFD/ND Omit  The flight data is abnormal and is not 
cognized by pilot. 
Influence on flight performance and 
flight path. 
Lapse Pilot does not cognize something wrong. Influence on flight performance and 
flight path. 
Nose up Timing error The control stick is moved too early. It need more force to control the 
stick. 
The control stick is moved too late. Tail strike 
Force error Too much pitch angle Tail strike 
Switch on two AP Omit  Two AP are not switched on. Not controlled by two AP. 
Thrust lever sets to 
CL 
Timing error Set to CL too early. Influence on climb performance. 
Set to CL too late. Influence on engine. 
 
We assume that the human performance is reduced due to fatigue. Fatigue includes acute fatigue and 
chronic fatigue. The fatigue will be induced by shift work or flight delay, so it is an acute fatigue. An 
acute fatigue can be cured after a nice sleep or rest. The intension of an acute fatigue is higher than a 
chronic one, but it is temporary and of short duration. The acute fatigue is included in the external PSFs. 
We assume that PSF equals to 2. Nominal human error probability is assumed to be 0.0004 referring to 
HEART method [10]. Each subtask is individual, that is to say, the dependence between each subtask 
equals to Zero. 
In this case, all of the subtasks are in the series. One task fails, the whole task fail. The event tree is 
shown in Fig 4. 
Therefore, the failure probability of the task induced by human errors in takeoff phases can be 
calculated as follows: 
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(1) Basic human error probability 
0.0004 2 0.0008BHEP NHEP PSFs u  u   
(2) Probability of the whole task 
151 (1 0.0008) 0.0113HEP      
Finally, we obtain that the failure probability of the whole task in takeoff phase is 0.0113. 
In this case, fatigue is the major contributory factor of human errors. Furthermore, the consequence 
caused by it can be very severe, especially in takeoff phase. Although the fatigue cannot be directly 
eliminated by hardware design, it can be catabatic by other ways. For example, caffeine is a legal drug to 
keep people alert.  Or by procedure design or training, for example, the cross checking is an effective way 
to resolve it. 
The result calculated will be feedback to SSA. The system designer will think about whether it is 
acceptable or not, thus, the improvement of the current design will be addressed. 
Likewise the human error modes and the consequences will be considered into PSSA and CMA. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Event tree in the takeoff phase 
5. Conclusions 
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Human error identification technique is an important part of HRA. A flight crew errors analysis and 
classification system is established to identify the human error modes. A method to assess flight crew 
errors is established based on THERP. In combination with the task analysis in takeoff phase and the 
interviews with pilots, flight crew errors are qualitatively analyzed. According to the event tree and 
scenario analysis, the failure probability of takeoff task is calculated. 
The results will be used into PSSA and CMA, and provide suggestions for the improvement of the 
system design.  
There are still some issues to be addressed in flight crew errors assessment. Firstly, there may be a 
number of factors concerned in the task analysis. Together with the scenario analysis, the global task 
analysis shall also be addressed. Secondly, the interdependence among subtasks shall be more carefully 
determined, since it may cause the significant influence on the conditional human error probability. 
Finally, different scenario will lead to different conclusions. How many scenarios that need to be taken 
into account, is a notable problem to the system designers. 
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